Frontier Analysis of UK Distribution Networks and the Question of Mergers: A Critique of Ofgem by Ziver Olmez
SEEDS         SURREY 
Surrey Energy Economics     ENERGY 
Discussion paper Series     ECONOMICS 









Frontier Analysis of UK 
Distribution Networks and the 
Question of Mergers: 










SEEDS 122  Department of Economics 
ISSN 1749-8384  University of Surrey 
  
The  Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC) consists of members of the 
Department of Economics who work on energy economics, environmental economics 
and regulation.  The Department of Economics has a long-standing tradition of energy 
economics research from its early origins under the leadership of Professor Colin 
Robinson.  This was consolidated in 1983 when the University established SEEC, 
with Colin as the Director; to study the economics of energy and energy markets.  
SEEC undertakes original energy economics research and since being established it 
has conducted research across the whole spectrum of energy economics, including 
the international oil market, North Sea oil & gas, UK & international coal, gas 
privatisation & regulation, electricity privatisation & regulation, measurement of 
efficiency in energy industries, energy & development, energy demand modelling & 
forecasting, and energy & the environment.  SEEC also encompasses the theoretical 
research on regulation previously housed in the department's Regulation & 
Competition Research Group (RCPG) that existed from 1998 to 2004. 
SEEC research output includes SEEDS - Surrey Energy Economic Discussion paper 
Series (details at www.seec.surrey.ac.uk/Research/SEEDS.htm) as well as a range 
of other academic papers, books and monographs.  SEEC also runs workshops and 
conferences that bring together academics and practitioners to explore and discuss 
the important energy issues of the day.   
SEEC also attracts a large proportion of the department’s PhD students and 
oversees the MSc in Energy Economics & Policy.  Many students have successfully 
completed their MSc and/or PhD in energy economics and gone on to very 




Director of SEEC and Editor of SEEDS: 
Lester C Hunt 
SEEC, 
Department of Economics, 
University of Surrey, 
Guildford GU2 7XH, 
UK. 
 
Tel:  +44 (0)1483 686956 
Fax:  +44 (0)1483 689548 
Email: L.Hunt@surrey.ac.uk 
 








Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC) 
Department of Economics 











FRONTIER ANALYSIS OF UK ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION 
NETWORKS AND THE QUESTION OF MERGERS: 











The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author.  
 
 
This paper may not be quoted or reproduced without permission. 




Since privatization, the 14 UK electricity distribution network operators 
(DNOs), being natural monopolies, have been subject to RPI-X 
regulation by the UK regulator (Ofgem). Mergers between the 14 DNOs 
have formed 7 identifiable ownerships (management teams).  It is argued 
in this research that Ofgem has not used a sufficiently robust approach to 
benchmarking, and has therefore failed to accurately assess network 
efficiency gains. Furthermore, Ofgem has used invalid arguments against 
further mergers. By using more informative panel datasets, as well as a 
more robust estimation technique (Stochastic Frontier Analysis), this 
research reveals two crucial facts. Firstly, there is almost no more room 
for the DNOs in question to become more cost efficient, as the industry is 
operating close to minimum efficient scale. This suggests that Ofgem 
needs to widen its scope of benchmarking and regulation (e.g. quality-
incorporated benchmarking). Secondly, there seems to be no increasing 
returns to scale in the industry, a more appropriate reason why further 
mergers should not take place. 
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FRONTIER ANALYSIS OF UK ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION 
NETWORKS AND THE QUESTION OF MERGERS: 









Electricity  distribution  networks  are  characteristically  natural  monopolies  and 
require  some  form  of  price  and/or  incentive  regulation.  This  is  so  that  distribution 
companies do not abuse monopoly power through rent-seeking and inefficient operation. 
If the regulatory regime is efficacious, then both producers and consumers become better 
off.  Some  countries  (including  some  states  in  the  USA)  have  adopted  different 
approaches  to  deal  with  this  problem.  These  include  penalty/reward  schemes  in 
meeting/exceeding/failing to meet quality standards, absolute fines (requiring firms to 




The purpose of this research is two fold.  
1. To provide a preliminary investigation of scale efficiency, prior to any quality 
incorporated  benchmarking  taking  place.  This  preliminary  investigation  is  necessary 
because, if there are any economies of scale to be reaped, and distribution companies 
cannot significantly increase their respective outputs, mergers need to take place between 
most  efficient  and  least  efficient  distribution  companies  (henceforth  known  as 
distribution network operators, or DNOs).
3  
                                                 
1 Ziver Olmez was a 2006/7 MSc student at the Surrey Energy Economics Centre, and is currently an 
independent researcher. For enquiries and discussions, he can be reached by e-mail at 
ziver.olmez@macrocapita.com  
2 The only country that currently has a fully functioning quality incorporated benchmarking system (quality 
dependant revenue caps) is Norway, which introduced the scheme in 2001.   
3 ‘Is there a case for mergers between DNOs in the UK?’ is the fundamental question this research will be 
answering  by  providing  valuable  findings  to  that  end.  Although  mergers  may  reduce  the  number  of 
comparators for benchmarking (a detriment of mergers voiced by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
(Ofgem)), it would also mean that the post-merger benchmarking could address more efficient (newly 
merged) firms, and therefore a higher scope for efficiency and quality improvements.     2 
 
2. The second key purpose of this research is to critically analyze the way in 
which the regulator, Ofgem
4, undertakes cost-function estimation and benchmarking that 
would answer this question of mergers. Pollitt (2005) has argued that Ofgem’s technical 
methodology and approach is not sufficiently robust for benchmarking.
5 The fourteen 
DNOs  are,  as  at  2007,  owned  by  seven  different  firms,  which  implies  that  any  cost 
analysis  and  benchmarking  method  should  reflect  this.  It  is  argued  here  that  when 
compared to a method of benchmarking that treats the seven firms as 14 separate entities 
(Ofgem’s method), grouping the DNOs with respect to ownership in cost analysis reveals 
critical and more accurate information on DNOs efficiencies. Consequently, this research 
will aim to improve on Ofgem’s benchmarking methodology.  
 
 The costs and benefits of potential mergers need to be correctly considered and 
measured,  so  as  to  circumvent  the  possibility  of  Ofgem  keeping  an  artificially  large 
number of DNOs in the market, solely for the purposes of benchmarking.  After all, if the 
results  from  this  research  imply  further  mergers,  this  could  create  two  importantly 
positive outcomes. Firstly it would mean that those DNOs would be operating closer to 
minimum efficient scale (and therefore lower average costs), and this creates more scope 
for lowering prices. Secondly, it would result in more efficient comparators, which not 
only makes the regulator’s job easier (by reducing inefficient outliers), but also increases 
overall  system  quality.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  results  of  this  research  imply  that 
mergers  should  no  longer  take  place,  then  this  would  suggest  that  Ofgem  should 
incorporate a more robust methodology in their benchmarking efforts (such as the one 
used here). Furthermore, it would suggest that DNOs are becoming significantly more 
efficient over time, hence requiring Ofgem to deepen its analysis of those DNOs, in order 
to capture other areas of possible improvement on overall distribution system quality.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) was previously OFFER (regulator for electricity) but 
combined with OFGAS (regulator for gas) to form Ofgem in 1999 (Bower, 2003). 
5 Due to, inter alia, insufficient data points in regression analysis, choice of regression estimation 
technique, and the treatment of the fourteen DNOs as fourteen separate entities, rather than grouping them 
with respect to ownership.   3 
 
2. The Need for Regulation 
 
Before focusing on the UK, it is appropriate initially to review and discuss the 
notion of incentive and price regulation and the necessity of regulation. 
 
The necessity of regulation stems from the concern that natural monopolies may 
raise their price above marginal cost and therefore cause a ‘deadweight’ loss, since output 
is restricted. If perfect information exists between customers and the monopolist, then a 
first-best outcome can be reached through bargaining. However, since this is not the case 
in reality, a regulatory body may be necessary. In any case, any bargaining that could 
occur, even in the presence of perfect information, would entail high transaction and 
bargaining costs and would probably prove inefficient (Cowan, 2006). Ideally, regulation 
is present to protect and promote the welfare of both consumer and producer. The varying 
approaches to achieving a well-functioning (or fitting) regulatory scheme are however 
subject to debate, and are governed by changing paradigms in the industrial environment.  
 
  The regulatory scheme of choice in the UK is the RPI-X price cap regulatory 
scheme, and its basic structure is as follows. First an index of prices for the regulated firm 
is derived. Then, the restriction that the annual growth rate of this index can be no more 
than the rate of general retail price inflation (RPI), less a predetermined figure (X), is 
imposed. Known as the ‘X’ factor, this predetermined figure is set for a period of five 
years, by the end of which a new ‘X’ value is introduced (dependant upon the degrees of 
change in industry and market conditions) for the upcoming five year period (Cowan, 
2006).  In this period of price control, the regulated firm retains all profits that it realizes 






   4 
3. Ofgem Critique 
 
Ofgem is the UK regulator for gas and electricity networks, and is overseen by the 
Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)
6 (as a result of the 
Utilities Act in 2000). In broad terms Ofgem’s roles is to make sure competitive markets 
work  successfully,  regulate  the  natural  monopoly  segments  of  gas  and  electricity 
networks,  ensure  secure  and  safe  supplies  of  electricity  and  gas,  and  more  recently, 
address environment and fuel poverty issues (Bower, 2003).  
 
The  distribution  segments  of  electricity  and  gas  (as  well  as  the  transmission 
segments) essentially have natural monopoly characteristics. This is because minimum 
efficient scale is large enough that even if competition were present, competing firms 
would  reap  these  scale  economies  by  merging  and  eventually  forming  a  monopoly 
anyway (Bower, 2003). Put simply, with respect to feasibility and logistics, it makes no 
sense to have competing wires and pipes providing energy/heat to buildings. Regulation 
therefore exists to ensure that distribution firms do not set prices at the monopoly level, 
so  as  to  protect  consumer  welfare.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  Ofgem  has  no 
authority  on  overseas  distribution  networks,  and  as  the  UK  becomes  increasingly 
dependent on imported energy (via interconnectors from the EU, for example), there is 
the danger of a growing grey area in the regulatory framework that must be addressed. 
This  is  perhaps  a  fitting  role  for  BERR,  especially  since  Ofgem’s  authority  has 
diminished since the Utilities Act (2000).  
 
However,  a  crucial  part  of  this  research  is  a  critical  discussion  on  Ofgem’s 
approach to benchmarking. There seem to be several set backs in Ofgem’s regulatory 
framework, vis-à-vis benchmarking methodology.
7 Pollitt (2005) provides an assessment 
of Ofgem’s approach, and the points below explore the author’s main findings.  
                                                 
6 Known as Department of Trade and Industry prior to May 2007. 
7 Initially, a consultation document is issued about 18 months before the end of the ongoing five year price 
control period, which addresses the timetable, and other issues for the next price review. Then, a final 
proposal document is issued about six months before the beginning of the next price review, detailing the X 
factors in the RPI-X framework, and proposing them to each DNO. Efficiency analysis is carried out to 
provide a single efficiency score for the benchmarked portion of costs in the year of analysis. Interestingly,   5 
 
•  The main benchmarking method that Ofgem uses is based on a regression analysis 
of operating costs (opex). Specifically, they use Corrected Ordinary Least Squares 
(COLS), a relatively simple estimation technique that lacks robustness. It cannot 
capture  time-varying  efficiency  gains  that  panel  data  can  for  instance.  It  also 
cannot distinguish between inefficiency and noise in the error term.
8  
 
•  After an OLS regression is run (opex against a composite variable of output), the 
estimated line of best fit (frontier) is ‘manually’ shifted downwards to intersect 
the  lowest  data  point.  This  in  effect  provides  a  frontier  line  against  which 
inefficient DNOs are then compared. This assumes a linear cost function, rather 
than a quadratic, which may not be realistic in practice. Furthermore, ‘manually 
shifting’ is rather crude, and inferior to alternative techniques such as stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA)
9 or data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
 
•  Ofgem  uses  only  one  explanatory  variable  in  its  specification,  which  is  a 
composite measure of output (composite scale variable, or CSV). In the 1999 
review, this was calculated as
10 
CSV = (Customer numbers) x   (Units distributed) x   (Network length)  
 
Using a composite measure such as the one above does not make it feasible to use 
square  and  interaction  terms,  which  could  prove  useful  in  frontier  analysis. 
However,  the  composite  measure  does  have  an  important  advantage  in  that  it 
avoids  potential  multicollinearity  issues  that  could  arise,  since  these  output 
                                                                                                                                                 
exploring the way in which Ofgem does this reveals that benchmarking is only one of many different stages 
in setting X factors (Pollitt, 2005).  
 
8 It should be noted, however, that with respect to practical application, transparency, verifiability, and low 
regulatory burden, the COLS methodology proves appropriate. 
9 CEPA (2003) found that SFA could not be implemented due to lack of sufficient data available to Ofgem. 
The rejection of such a robust parametric method solely due to a ‘lack of sufficient data size’ seems like a 
curious (and poor) excuse, since a fitting panel dataset is readily available for this purpose, and is in fact 
used in this research. 
10 It was acknowledged that customer numbers are not relevant to DNOs whose customers are supply/retail 
companies. This led to Ofgem imposing a higher weight on network length (^0.5) and a lower weight on 
customer numbers (^0.25) for the 2004 price review (Pollitt, 2005).   6 
variables in fact move in the same direction at once (Pollitt, 2005). Ofgem does 
not explore other cost drivers that may be crucial for cost function estimation. It 
could be that factors such as climate, topography, customer density (and other 
drivers that are not necessarily output variables) may affect costs significantly.  
 
•  Mergers, one of the main focuses of this research, happens to be a crucial issue 
for  the  implementation  of  Ofgem’s  methodology.  There  are  fourteen  distinct 
DNOs  with  fourteen  respective  areas  covering  England,  Wales  and  Scotland. 
However, these fourteen DNOs are owned by seven independent companies, as 
mergers  and  buy-outs  already  took  place  during  the  1995-2002  period.  This 
implies that separate benchmarking of the fourteen DNOs may in actual fact no 
longer  be  valid.  This  potential  invalidity  arises  from  the  possibility  that  these 
seven companies can manipulatively (mis)represent higher overall efficiency by 
moving costs around between the DNOs that they own (Pollitt, 2005)
11.  
 
•  Both the 1999 and 2004 price reviews used data from the previous (single) year 
alone,  1997-1998  and  2002-2003  respectively.  Panel  data  could  increase  the 
robustness of estimates by providing more data points, allowing for time-varying 
effects, and allowing for the use of more versatile/powerful statistical techniques 
(DEA  and/or  SFA).  It  would  also  allow  the  inclusion  of  additional  variables 
directly into the cost function specification. It is not at all clear why Ofgem have 




•  Ofgem have not sufficiently explored the possibility of using international data 
for benchmarking. It has been noted that they argue against mergers mainly due to 
the loss of comparators in benchmarking (Ofgem, 2002). However, as the UK 
                                                 
11 CEPA (2003) explore how aggregating available data into the seven groups and using the resulting 
‘grouped’ dataset for estimation and frontier analysis may alter efficiency estimates of DNOs. Their results 
showed that efficiency scores for all DNOs increase. Although, the number of data points becomes even 
lower by using seven firms and the robustness of statistical estimates is questionable under such a setup. 
The use of panel data, however, can improve these estimates.   
12 Electricity Industry Review series, Electrica Service Ltd. 
   7 
becomes more import dependant with respect to energy/fuel source, and as the 
European  grid  becomes  more  integrated,  it  could  prove  useful  to  incorporate 
DNOs  across  Europe,  faced  with  similar  cost  driving  characteristics,  into  the 




4. The ‘Merger Effect’ 
 
Ofgem (2002) has argued that mergers amongst DNOs could be detrimental to 
benchmarking, since it implies losing comparators. A counter-argument is that this loss 
would  be  compensated,  as  any  post-merger  benchmarking  would  include  only  the 
resulting most efficient DNOs, which gives scope for higher standards. These higher 
standards, as well as the improvements accruing from the mergers, would then translate 
into welfare gains to customers.
14 
 
There seems to be an exaggerated fear of loss of comparators. Mergers are likely 
to take place between an efficient and inefficient firm, or two inefficient firms, in order to 
a) increase output to minimize the gap between current long run average cost levels and 
minimum efficient scale, and b) in order to increase overall system efficiency. Even if 
there were many comparators, benchmarking methods and comparisons between DNOs 
become less helpful in the long run, as regulation means DNOs become increasingly cost 
efficient with time.  
 
Furthermore,  the  method  used  for  quantifying  the  detriment  of  mergers  is  arguably 
fundamentally flawed and the controversy surrounding this calculation is noted in the 
Ofgem  (2002)  proposal.  The  method  assumes  that  all  mergers  result  in  an  equal 
detriment,  and  fails  to  take  into  account  the  fact  that  Ofgem  still  is  able  to  make 
comparisons across fourteen DNOs, regardless. If any anti-merger arguments are to be 
made, they should ideally be done so on the basis that DNOs have achieved such levels 
                                                 
13 This suggestion is very plausible, since nine of the fourteen DNOs are in fact foreign owned (Pollitt, 
2005).   
14 A guide to Ofgem’s views regarding mergers can be acquired from the associated Ofgem consultation 
documents (2001), and their policy statement (2002) – www.ofgem.gov.uk   8 
of efficiency, that they are operating close to minimum efficient scale, and, if the DNOs 
exhibit any undesirable characteristics thereafter, a more appropriate regulatory method 
should be employed.  
 
5. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
 
SFA is a parametric method that uses a maximum likelihood (ML) estimation 
framework to calculate parameter estimates for regressors in a model. There are a number 
of  assumptions  that  can  be  made  about  the  distribution  of  the  error  terms  in  SFA. 
Choosing which distribution to use in the estimation process is governed by factors such 
as computational convenience, or theoretical preference. This depends on the beliefs of 
the researcher. Generally, these distributions can be divided into half-normal, truncated 
normal and exponential (with different means) (Coelli et al, 2005).  
 
The basic SFA model used in this research is structured as follows, 
 
(1)  cit = xitb + (vit  + uit)      ; i = 1,…..,N, t = 1,…..,T 
 
where, 
cit  is the natural log of the operating expenditure (cost) o f the i-th DNO/firm in 
the t-th time period.  
xit is a (k x 1) vector of input quantities (or cost drivers) of the i-th firm in the t-th 
time period.  
  b is a vector of unknown parameters (coefficients). 
vit  is  statistical  noise  in  the  data  (random  error  terms).  It  consists  of  random 
variables.  We  assume  that  they  are  independently  and  identically  distributed  [iid 
N(0, v²)]. We also assume they are independent of uit (the inefficiency term),  
where,            uit  = (Ui exp(-η(t -T)))  
   9 
(Ui  exp(-η(t  -T)))  are  non-negative  random  variables.  We  assume  that  they 
account  for  the  cost  of  inefficiency  in  production.  We  also  assume  that  the  are  iid 
N( , u²), where η is a parameter that needs to be estimated.  
Therefore if vit ≠ 0 but uit = 0, then the model collapses to OLS, since this implies 
that there is no inefficiency.  
 
SFA is a much more robust method than COLS because it divides up the error 
term into two parts, one to measure (in)efficiency, and the other part to measure noise. 
The first of these, uit (a one-sided non-negative error term), captures the effect of costs, 
and the second, vit , captures the effect of noise.  
 
The fact that SFA takes into account heterogeneity between comparators (which 
may be due to geological differences between areas, among other things) makes it a more 
appropriate technique than alternatives. Furthermore, ML estimators have many desirable 
large  sample  properties  (asymptotic  properties)  that  are  asymptotically  more  efficient 
than the COLS estimator (Coelli et al, 2005). However, this does suggest that the sample 
needs to be sufficiently large for ML estimators to outperform COLS estimators. One of 
Ofgem’s justifications for using COLS was the lack of sufficient data. However, in this 
research, a sufficiently large sample of data on DNOs is used, and therefore allows for 
the use of SFA. Conventional hypothesis tests can be carried out as well, which can tell 
us a lot about the significance of cost drivers.  
 
One disadvantage of SFA is that a functional form needs to be specified for the 
cost (production) function that is to be estimated, and furthermore, a distribution of the 
error term needs to be specified as well. However, with realistic assumptions, and a good 
understanding of the particular industry, these functional and distributional forms can be 
defined appropriately. Regarding Ofgem’s concern for mergers and losing comparators, 
removing a comparator in an SFA framework would have an effect, in so far as resulting 
in a shift of the estimated frontier and a difference in confidence intervals associated with   10 
the parameters. However how this occurs and to what extent depends on the comparator 
being removed (Europe Economics, 2001). 
 
  Generally, the costs of operating a distribution system are those that are incurred 
in building and maintaining the system (lines, mains, transformers and measuring and 
billing electricity) (Filippini et al. 2004). Operating expenditure data is used to proxy 
costs, as opposed to capital expenditure (or total expenditure), since any costs savings 
that can be realized by a DNO (within the five year review) are those on the operating 
side. The major costs drivers are commonly total number of customers, customer density 
in the area, size of the serviced area, total kWh sold, length of the distribution line and 
maximum demand. For better comparability (with the regulator’s findings), as well as 
availability of data, the three cost drivers used in this specification are circuit length (in 
kms), number of distribution customers, and units of electricity distributed (gWh). These 
are the three variables in forming the composite variable that Ofgem uses in cost function 
estimation.  Effectively,  the  DNOs’  operating  costs  for  distributing  electricity  can  be 
represented by the function,   
   
(2)  C = C (Y, NC, CL)     
 
where, 
C  = Operating Expenditure (opex) 
Y   = Output (gWh)  
CL  = Circuit Length (both overhead and underground) 
NC   = Number of Customers 
 
 
6. The Cost Function (three models) 
  6.1 The Three Models 
  The estimation of this cost function requires some functional form specification. 
A  log-log  (Cobb-Douglas)  functional  form  is  commonly  used  (as  is  the  translog 
specification) and would be appropriate in this case, since the function is non-decreasing   11 
and linearly homogenous (Coelli et al, 2005).
15 It would have been useful to include input 
prices as additional regressors, however lack of data availability did not permit this. The 
models are assumed to be distributed as truncated normal random variables, with time-
varying inefficiency effects.  This is so that technical efficiency changes over time can be 
assessed.  
 
(3)  ln C = β 0 + β y lnY it + β CL lnCLit + β NC lnNCit + vit  + uit     (Model 1) 
 
 
where   is a non-negative variable representing inefficiency, and   represents errors of 
approximation and other sources of statistical noise. As previously mentioned, these three 
regressors above can give rise to meaningless and/or insignificant coefficient estimates 
due to multicollinearity. However, since these three variables are important cost drivers, a 
composite scale variable (CSV) identical to the one used by the regulator (Ofgem) will be 
used.  
(4)  CSV = (Customer numbers) x (Units distributed) x (Network length)   
 
  Note  that  in  this  setup,  network  length  has  the  higher  weight  of  the  three 
regressors.  Ofgem  used  this  setup  in  their  2004  benchmarking  analysis.
16  Using  the 
composite variable in this analysis enables better comparability of the results here with 





                                                 
15 Cobb-Douglas forms are first-order flexible, in that they have sufficient parameters to provide a first-
order differential approximation to a random function at a single point. Although translog forms are 
second-order flexible, a Cobb-Douglas form is more appropriate here since there is only one parameter to 
estimate (CSV). Furthermore, this avoids multicollinearity issues.  
16 It has been observed that units distributed and customer numbers are almost perfectly correlated (CEPA, 
2003). Furthermore, connected customers as such are irrelevant to DNOs whose customers are made up of 
supply companies (implying that customer numbers could even be dropped from the CSV measure 
altogether, resulting in the assignment of a 50-50 weight on the remaining two variables). Also, it is argued 
that network length can act as a proxy for geographical (topological) differences in DNOs’ respective 
regions. These findings led to Ofgem assigning a higher weight on network length. 
   12 
Thus, the composite model (2) becomes, 
(5)  ln C = β 0 + β CSV lnCSV it + vit  + uit    (Model 2) 
 
  where,
17   lnCSV = [(lnNC)   x (lnY)   x (lnCL)  ] 
   
   
It is also worth taking into account a neutral approach to the weighting of these 
variables to form the composite scale variable (CSV). That is, we can assume that all 
three variables have equal weight in affecting costs. Therefore, a third model can be 
formed as follows. 
(6)  ln C = β 0 + β CSV lnCSV it + vit  + uit    (Model 3) 
 
where,    lnCSV = [(lnNC)   x (lnY)  x (lnCL)  ] 
 
  In this Model (3), in assuming that all variables have equal weight, what is being 
sought is to uncover (if any) significant differences in estimated parameters as a result of 
Ofgem’s  choice  of  weighting.  If  the  differences  in  estimation  are  minimal,  and 
conclusions the same, then the Ofgem’s choice of weights (Model 2) can be used with 
more confidence and authority.   
 
6.2 Efficiency Predictions 
 
Within this framework, Coelli (1996) defines cost efficiency relative to the cost 
frontier as, 
(7)  EFFi = E( Ci |Ui, Xi ) / E(Ci *|Ui, =0,Xi )  ; 1≤EFFi ≤∝   
 
where,  is  the  cost  of  the  i-th  DNO/firm,  which  would  be  equal  to    when  the 
dependent (opex) variable is in original units, and equal to exp( ) when it is in natural 
logs.  
 
Expression (7) can be interpreted as ‘the ratio of actual costs to the efficient level 
of costs’ (Filippini et al, 2004).  can take values between 1 and infinity. The closer 
the   value is to one, the more efficient the DNO/firm, and vice versa. For example, 
                                                 
17 Note that, in this case, CSV is a logged (natural log) regressor.   13 
if  =1.25,  then  that  DNO/firm’s  cost  inefficiency  is  25%.  Alternatively,  the 
DNO/firm’s cost is 25% higher than the cost of an equivalent firm that is efficient.  
 


















  The  panel  dataset  used  here  holds  much  more  information  then  that  used  by 
Ofgem. For all fourteen DNOs, data on circuit length (in Kms), number of distribution 
customers, and units of electricity distributed (GWh) was collected from the electricity 
industry reviews 5 through 10. This covers a period from 1999/00 to 2004/05. The data 
on operating expenditure (opex), the dependent variable in the analysis, was collected 
from Ofgem’s Electricity Industry Price Control Review Publications (2003, 2004, and 
2005). Ofgem has used different measurements of opex for different years and hence 
some of the data had to be adjusted for standardization purposes. For this reason, some of 
the opex figures may not be the exact ones reported in the reviews. Ultimately, this data 
consists of a panel of fourteen DNOs across six periods. Each period equals one year, and 
therefore the data covers six years. This yields a total of 84 data points, solving the  
problem of insufficient data points, which Ofgem faced. This is called DATASET – 1.  
 
It may indeed be the case that previously obtained estimates and efficiency scores 
by Ofgem are inaccurate, since the fourteen DNOs are owned by seven different entities. 
Therefore, a second dataset is formed by grouping the DNOs in DATASET – 1 into their 
respective ownerships (over the exact same period, using the same variables). This is   14 
called DATASET – 2. The grouping was done by summing the figures (of variables) of 
each of the DNOs owned by the same firm. Figure 1.1 illustrates this setup.
18 
 



































Figure 1.1 – DATASET -1 :  DATASET -2 
 
                                                 
18  Most  of  the  DNOs  transferred  ownership  (or  merged)  between  the  years  1998  and  2002,  with  the 
exception of Manweb, which was sold to Scottish Power Energy in 1995. The advantage of this dataset is 
that it captures this period of mergers, and subsequent years thereafter. This further justifies the use of 
DATASET-2, to explore the differences in efficiency scores, when compared to DATASET-1.  
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8. Results 
 





Model 2 - Ofgem Weights  Dataset - 1 - 14 DNOs 
Model 3 - Neutral Weights  Dataset - 2 - 7 Ownerships       
         
Dependent Variable – lnC  Constant  Coefficient 
(lnCSV)  σ²  Log-Likelihood 
           
Model 2 (Dataset - 1)  -3.337***  0.663***  0.064  6.497 
N = 14, T = 6  (-3.35)  (7.384)      
           
Model 2 (Dataset - 2)  -8.847***  1.134***  0.064***  5.358 
N = 7, T = 6  (-8.882)  (13.804)      
           
Model 3 (Dataset - 1)  -3.282***  0.669***  0.412  14.694 
N = 14, T = 6  (-3.295)  (7.182)      
           
Model 3 (Dataset - 2)  -10.022***  1.240***  0.034***  11.464 
N = 7, T = 6  (-9.914)  (14.634)      
          
***,**,*: at 0.1%, 1%, 
5% respectively  
 
Table 1.1 – Frontier Analysis Results 
 
 
Both  Model  2  and  3  were  acceptable  (as  parameters  were  significant),  and 
therefore  Model  2  (Ofgem  Weights)  results  will  be  used  hereafter  to  enable  better 
comparability with Ofgem’s method.
20 Economies of scale prevail if the average costs of 
an  electricity  distribution  utility  fall  as  the  output  (volume  of  electricity  sold)  in  a 
network area rise (Filippini et al, 2004). In the model, this can be calculated as follows, 
 







                                                 
19 Preliminary research revealed that Model 1 produces insignificant parameter estimates and therefore is 
omitted altogether.  
20 Model 3 parameters were not significantly different from Model 2, meaning that both Models led to 
similar conclusions. The motivation for proceeding with Model 2 therefore is to enable better comparability 
with Ofgem’s model.    16 
Economies of Scale estimates 
(Model 2 Only) 
Note: economies of scale 
exist if statement (13) > 1 
     
Dataset - 1  1.51 
Dataset - 2  0.88 
 
Table 1.2 – Economies of Scale estimates 
 
 
The mean efficiencies of DNOs in Dataset – 1 versus those of firms (ownerships) 




MODEL- 2           
PERIOD  DATASET-1  DATASET-2  DIFFERENCE 
1  1.478  1.711  -0.233 
2  1.303  1.203  0.100 
3  1.199  1.068  0.131 
4  1.133  1.024  0.109 
5  1.090  1.009  0.081 
6  1.061  1.003  0.058 
 
Table 1.3 – Mean Efficiency 
                         
 
    
 
 
Figure 1.2 - Mean Efficiency
21 
                                                 
21  Period 1 = 1999/2000, Period 6 = 2004/2005   17 
9. Evaluation 
  
These  results  warrant  the  critique  of  Ofgem’s  benchmarking  technique  and 
attitude towards mergers. Furthermore, they justify the criticisms made therein. The key 
points below discuss what exactly these results point towards, and what may have to be 
altered in the regulator’s approach in order incorporate a more robust and wholesome 
approach to regulation.  
 
•  Regarding mean efficiencies, the results indicate lower inefficiency when using 
Dataset - 2, rather than Dataset - 1. Figure 1.1 above illustrates this. This means 
that  if  one  estimates  the  parameters  in  the  model  according  to  their  seven 
ownership  categories  (as  one  should),  then  we  see  that  the  DNOs  have  been 
realizing  greater  efficiency  gains  between  1999/00  and  2004/05  than  would 
otherwise have been estimated. Although Dataset-2 yields greater inefficiency in 
period 1, from period 2 onwards it yields greater efficiency. This suggests that the 
takeover/mergers  that  took  place  were  still  in  their  infancy  in  period  1,  but 
through  time,  as  the  benefits  of  mergers  were  realized  (better  management, 
investment  in  new  technology,  and  so  on),  these  mergers  resulted  in  greater 
efficiency gains for the 14 DNOs in question. 
 
•  The  mean  efficiencies,  which  can  also  be  interpreted  as  industry  efficiency, 
whether it is for Dataset-1 or Dataset-2, were extremely close to 1 in 2004/05. The 
closer this value is to 1, the more efficient the industry is, ceteris paribus. This 
suggests that firms have been rapidly becoming cost efficient, and that Ofgem’s 
regulatory  authority  has  been  effective.  However,  it  also  suggests  that  further 
efficiency gains, if sought after, will have to originate from non-cost related areas 
such  as  quality  of  service  (such  as  number/duration  of  outages  and  customer 
service).  This  does  imply  that  a  quality-incorporated  benchmarking  approach 
should  be  implemented,  as  was  suggested  by  Pollitt  (2005).  The  danger  with 
Ofgem continuing with its current benchmarking approach is that the any further 
efficiency gains realized by the 14 DNOs (7 firms) will most likely not outweigh   18 
the costs of further Ofgem price reviews, and can lead Ofgem to over-regulate on 
the cost front.       
 
•  The  output  elasticities,  and  consequently  returns  to  scale,  reveal  the  most 
important point accruing from this analysis, that being, Dataset-2 results suggest 
that no more mergers should take place. When using the output elasticity from 
Dataset-1  to  calculate  economies  of  scale,  it  is  seen  that  there  are  increasing 
returns to scale in the industry and output should be increased further to reap these 
returns. Ceteris paribus, and perceiving mergers as a way to increase output, this 
suggests that more mergers can take place. However, these results are misleading 
as  they  do  not  take  into  account  the  seven  ownerships,  possible  management 
improvements, technology investments and cost shifting that can arise from these 
ownerships. Therefore, for more insight, one can turn to the Dataset-2 results. 
These  show  that  in  fact  there  are  decreasing  returns  to  scale  in  the  industry 
(although not by much, as the 0.88 value is close to 1, indicating constant returns 
to scale). One can conclude from this, that no more mergers ought to take place in 
the UK electricity distribution sector.  
 
•  Ofgem can use these findings as a stronger argument for avoiding further mergers 
in the industry. This is particularly important as Ofgem’s current argument of 
losing comparators is invalid. Furthermore, incorporating European DNOs into 
the benchmarking framework has not been yet considered, and possibly should 
be.   
 
The results obtained in this research point out the inappropriate stance Ofgem has 
taken  against  mergers,  specifically,  that  mergers  would  hinder  the  integrity  of 
benchmarking, by compromising the available number of comparators in the industry. 
Furthermore, it has shed light on the future direction of benchmarking, regulation, and 
merger behaviour in the utility sectors.  
 




A panel dataset can be used to employ a more robust frontier analysis technique 
and Ofgem should more seriously consider in its next price control review, to use the 7 
ownerships (management teams) in its benchmarking framework. This would ensure that 
the  data  paint  a  more  accurate  picture  of  industry  efficiency.  Furthermore,  since  the 
results here suggest that most cost efficiency gains have been realized, further mergers 
are not warranted in the industry. Therefore a more wholesome and non-cost focused 
benchmarking framework needs to be employed in order to improve electricity network 
performance.  As  suggested  earlier,  quality  incorporated  benchmarking  is  one  option 
already employed in some countries such as Norway, and should be considered for the 
Ofgem regulatory framework.  
 
As  we  see  the  dawn  of  a  more  integrated  European  electricity  distribution 
network,  it  seems  appropriate  that  similar  European  DNOs  are  incorporated  into  the 
benchmarking process, which can be a step in facilitating a more standardized, efficient, 
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